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1 | INTRODUCTION
A number of studies have addressed the important question of how the value generated by pharmaceuticals is shared 
between patients served by health systems and drug manufacturers (Camejo et al., 2014; Grabner et al., 2011; Jena & 
Philipson, 2008; Lindgren & Jonsson, 2012; Moreno & Ray, 2016). These studies estimate that patients served by health 
systems accrue 59%–98% of the total value generated by new drugs and manufacturers accrue the remaining 2%–41% 
of value. This has led to questions about whether this return is sufficient to incentivize socially optimal levels of R&D 
investments; that is whether current policy will lead to dynamic efficiency (Jena & Philipson, 2008).
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Abstract
Previous studies have estimated that patients served by health systems accrue 
59-98% of the value generated by new pharmaceuticals. This has led to ques-
tions about whether sufficient returns accrue to manufacturers to incentivize 
socially optimal levels of R&D. These studies have not, however, fully reflected 
the health opportunity costs imposed by payments for branded pharmaceuti-
cals. We present a framework for estimating how the value generated by new 
branded pharmaceuticals is shared. We quantify value in net health effects 
and account for benefits and health opportunity costs in the patent period and 
post-patent period when generic/biosimilar products become available. We ap-
ply the framework to 12 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence ap-
praisals and show that realized net health effects range from losses of 160%, to 
gains of 94%, of the potential net health benefits available. In many cases, even 
in the long run, the benefits of new medicines are not sufficient to offset the 
opportunity costs of payments to manufacturers, and approval is expected to 
reduce population health. This cannot be dynamically efficient as it incentivizes 
future innovation at prices which will also reduce population health. Further 
work should consider how to reflect these findings in reimbursement policies.
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These studies estimate total value by valuing health gains according to an approval norm (often called a cost-effec-
tiveness threshold) or an estimate of the consumption value of health (estimated as individuals' willingness to pay for 
a quality-adjusted life year [QALY] or value per statistical life) and compare this to payments for the branded product. 
This approach does not acknowledge the difference between approval norms or estimates of the consumption value of 
health, and estimates of the likely health opportunity costs of payments for branded products. Empirical evidence now 
indicates that the health opportunity costs of health care funds are considerably higher than existing approval norms or 
estimates of consumption value suggest (Claxton et al., 2015; Lomas et al., 2019; Ochalek et al., 2018). The proportion of 
value accruing to manufacturers is, therefore, likely to be higher than previously estimated.
In this study we set out (1) a general framework for estimating the total value of a new branded drug and how this is 
shared between patients served by health systems and manufacturers; (2) the evidence required to support an empirical 
assessment of value and how this is shared and the nature of this evidence in the UK context; and (3) the results of ap-
plying this framework to a sample of products approved by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
in England.
2 | FRAMEWORK FOR ESTIMATING VALUE AND HOW THIS IS SHARED
Figure 1 shows how the value accruing to each party is calculated. We describe the framework for contexts in which pric-
ing and reimbursement decisions are based on cost-effectiveness, and technologies are assessed as cost-effective if their 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is below an approval norm (often referred to as a cost-effectiveness thresh-
old). The framework can also be applied in contexts where different approaches to pricing and reimbursement are used, 
as long as evidence relating to cost-effectiveness is available.
We measure value using net health effects, which account for both the health gains from using a new drug and the 
health opportunity costs associated with the additional costs of funding it. Costs to the health system can be expressed 
as health foregone using a measure of health opportunity cost, k. For example, if k is £15,000/QALY this implies that for 
every £15,000 of health care resources used to fund a treatment, 1 QALY of health is displaced elsewhere in the health 
system.
2.1 | Total potential net health effects generated by new branded medicines
The total potential net health effects generated by a new medicine per treated patient is the health gains generated by 
the product (h), compared to the relevant comparator, less the health opportunity costs associated with the additional 







Health benefits and marginal costs accrue over different timeframes depending on the drug and clinical indication. 
The values presented in Equation (1) reflect total lifetime values discounted to the present. To simplify exposition, in this 
section we assume there are no other incremental costs to the health care system associated with introducing the new 
drug. We revisit this assumption in Section 2.4.
The net health effects accrue each time a patient initiates the new treatment. Assuming a constant annual number of 
























where r is the overall annual discount rate considered relevant to comparing health interventions accruing benefits and 
costs over different time frames. As show in Equation (2), net health effects accrue over an infinite time horizon. In 
practice, usage may decline as new products emerge and products will often eventually become obsolete. However, so 
long as the value of these new drugs are assessed relative to existing comparators, the contribution of older treatments to 
population health “lives on” even once they have been replaced by new and better alternatives.
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2.2 | Realized population net health effects
We now consider the net health effects that accrue to patients served by health systems, taking in to account the price 
paid for branded medicines. At launch, companies face incentives to achieve the highest price that would permit ap-
proval. We therefore assume that the incremental drug cost (i.e., the price premium compared to the comparator) is set 
equal to  h  where  is the approval norm. This approval norm is often described as a cost-effectiveness threshold. In 
the patent period, patients served by the health system accrue the health gains minus the health opportunity costs of the 







This is positive if the approval norm (λ) is less than the measure of health opportunity cost  k , and negative if the 
approval norm exceeds the measure of health opportunity cost. We use the term “patent period” throughout the study, 
we intend this to represent the period over which a broader suite of intellectual property rights protects new drugs from 
generic/biosimilar competition.
For the time being, we assume that once the drug comes off patent it is sold at the marginal cost of production by 
the original manufacturer or competitors selling generics/biosimilars. Post-patent patients served by the health system 
accrue all available net health gains (as shown in Equation 1). This will be positive as long as the drug delivers net health 
gains at generic/biosimilar prices, that is, as long as the ICER of the drug at generic/biosimilar prices is below the meas-
ure of health opportunity cost.
The realized population net health effects including both patent and post-patent periods are:
   
 
  
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t  denotes the duration of the patent.
If this drug is supplanted by another new medicine (which we call here “new 2”), the value described in Equation (4) 
for “new 1” will continue to accrue to patients served by health systems as long as new 2 is priced relative to the generic 
version of new 1 once new 1's patent expires.
2.3 | Health foregone due to payments to manufacturers
We convert value accruing to manufacturers, which is most naturally considered in monetary terms, to health foregone 
by patients to allow comparisons of value accruing to each party using a common numeraire. The health foregone due 
to payments to manufacturers is calculated as the opportunity cost of the incremental price premium paid for the drug 
minus the health opportunity costs imposed by the incremental marginal cost of production:
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F I G U R E  1  Simplified schematic of value accruing to different parties in health terms. This schematic assumes generic prices are equal 
to production costs, generic uptake is immediate and complete at loss of patent protection, and no additional costs to the health system are 




















If, within its patent period, this drug is supplanted by another new medicine (new 2) the value described in Equa-
tion (6) for new 1 will accrue to the new 2 manufacturer. Equation (6) therefore represents the overall value accruing to 
all originator brand manufacturers rather than necessarily the value accruing to the manufacturer of the appraised drug. 
How this value should be split between originator manufacturers is beyond the scope of this study.
2.4 | Incorporating additional health system costs
Appendix A shows how the framework changes when additional health system costs or savings are included. Additional 
health-care costs reduce the price premium to the manufacturer during the patent period and reduce population health 
gains in the post-patent period. Cost savings increase payments to the manufacturer during the patent period and in-
crease population health gains in the post-patent period.
2.5 | Numeric example
We now illustrate this framework using a simple numeric example with data as shown in Table 1. This numeric example 
is based on the UK context, however the numbers used are intended to simplify the numeric illustration and should not 
be taken as representing parameter estimates. For example, 10 years is shorter than the average period of patent protec-
tion afforded to new medicines which is estimated to be closer to 13 years (Copenhagen Economics, 2018). We discuss 
data available to inform empirical estimates of value and value shares in Section 3.
We use a time horizon of 100 years throughout this study as beyond this point discounting means that any additional 
value generated by the drug will be minimal.
Table 2 shows total potential net health effects, realized population net health effects and health foregone due to 
payments to manufacturers, when the approval norm reflects the measure of health opportunity cost (  k). The manu-
facturer receives a price premium relative to the comparator of £7500 per treated patient (0.5 QALYs × £15,000/QALY). 
All available health gains (0.5 QALYs per patient treated) accrue as payments to the manufacturer in the patent period 
as the price is set such that the health opportunity costs of payments to the manufacturer just offset the health gains 
from using the product. There is no population health gain in the patent period and the population gains the full health 
benefits of the drug (0.5 QALYs per patient treated) in the post-patent period. Population health gain is 10,008 QALYs 
representing 70% of the total potential net health gains, and the health opportunity cost of payments to the manufacturer 
is 4304 QALYs (30% of the total). The cumulative value accruing to each party is shown in Figure 2a. For simplicity, these 
graphs show discounted lifetime net health effects for patients who initiate treatment in a given year as accruing within 
that year, in reality these benefits will be spread over a longer time horizon.
Table 3 shows what happens when the approval norm is £30,000/QALY. The total potential net health effects are un-
changed; however, the higher approval norm changes how value is shared. The manufacturer receives a price premium of 
£15,000 per treated patient (0.5 QALYs × £30,000/QALY). This payment to the manufacturer imposes an opportunity cost 
of 1 QALY per patient treated which exceeds the health gains generated from using the product (0.5 QALYs per patient 
treated). Therefore, during the patent period there is a loss in population health of 0.5 QALYs per patient treated. In the 
post-patent period, the health system accrues all health gains as in Table 2. Population health gain is 5704 QALYs which 
represents 40% of the total potential net health gains, and the health opportunity cost of payments to the manufacturer 
is 8608 QALYs (60% of the total). The cumulative value accruing to each party is shown in Figure 2b. This shows that it 
takes until year 26 for the population health gains accrued during the post-patent period to offset the health losses in the 
patent period.
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Figure 3 shows the proportion of total potential value accruing as population health gains, at a range of approval norms 
considered relevant to the UK: £15,000/QALY represents a reasonable estimate of the opportunity cost of NHS funds,1 
£20,000–30,000/QALY is NICE's stated approval norm range (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2013) 
with higher values within this range reserved for appraisals with particular features, £40,000/QALY reflects an empirical 
estimate of the ICER above which the probability of rejection by NICE committees exceeds 50% (Dakin et al., 2015), and 
£50,000/QALY is the approval norm thought to be in operation for products that meet NICE's criteria for life-extending 
end-of-life (EoL) treatments (Griffiths, 2016). In the numeric example, once the approval norm exceeds £50,000/QALY, 
the manufacturer accrues more than 100% of the total value and approval of the product reduces population health. This 
occurs as the health opportunity costs of payments for the branded product during the patent period are not offset by net 
health gains in the post-patent period.
2.6 | Factors determining shares of value
We also explored how a range of factors affect the value accruing to each party. Longer patent durations and other factors 
that delay availability of generic/biosimilar products or reduce their market penetrance, reduce the share of value accru-
ing as population health gains. The epidemiology of the patient population can change how value is shared by altering 
the distribution of usage between the patent and post-patent periods. In clinical indications where incidence increases 
over time, this increases utilization post-patent, increasing the share of value accruing as population health gains. An 
example of this would be antibiotics reserved for the treatment of emerging drug-resistant infections. A similar effect 
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Parameter Description Value
h Incremental health gain (QALYs) 0.50
k Measure of health opportunity cost (expenditure to gain one QALY) £15,000
P
t Patent duration in years 10
mc Incremental marginal cost £0
t
n Population treated in each year 1000
r Annual discount rate for costs and health outcomes 3.5%
Abbreviation: QALY, quality-adjusted life year.
T A B L E  1  Parameters used in numeric example
Metric Patent period Post-patent Total
Per patient values
 Total potential net health effects 0.50 0.50
 Realized population net health effects 0.00 0.50
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer 0.50 0.00
Total values accrued over time (undiscounted)
 Total potential net health effects 5000 45,000 50,000
 Realized population net health effects 0 45,000 45,000
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer 5000 0 5000
Total values accrued over time (discounted)
 Total potential net health effects 4304 10,008 14,312
 Realized population net health effects 0 10,008 10,008
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer 4304 0 4304
Note: All values are net health effects in QALYs.
Abbreviations: k, measure of health opportunity cost; λ, approval norm; QALY, quality-adjusted life year.
T A B L E  2  Results of numeric example with approval norm set equal to measure of health opportunity cost (λ = k = £15,000/QALY)
occurs if prescribing increases once generic/biosimilar versions of the product become available.2 If the prevalent pop-
ulation eligible for treatment is relatively large then this focuses usage within the patent period, reducing the share of 
value accruing as population health gains. For example, a large number of people living with hepatitis C recently became 
eligible for a series of new drug treatments, whereas long-term incidence of hepatitis C is expected to be relatively low 
(NHS, 2019a).
The numeric example above assumes patients initiated on treatment within the patent period will complete their 
treatment within the patent period. This is appropriate for one-off treatments and treatments with a relatively short du-
ration. For longer duration treatments, some patients initiated on branded medicines within the patent period may have 
the latter parts of their treatment course fulfilled by generics/biosimilars. Longer treatment courses therefore increase 
the share of value accruing as population health gains.3
In addition to payments for the branded product, other health system costs also affect how value is shared. Two 
types of costs are relevant here. The first are additional production costs. For example, although costs of biosimilars are 
reducing, these drugs remain much costlier than small-molecule generic drugs due to additional costs associated with 
development, and production (see Section 3 for further detail). The second relate to the impact of using the new drug 
on use of other NHS resources, for example, due to treatment administration, required infrastructure, monitoring, or 
disease management. These can be significant as shown in the recent appraisals of CAR-T therapies (National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence, 2018). We consider how value shares differ for two illustrative drugs that offer the same 
total potential net health gains but differ in production or NHS costs as shown in Table 4. The first drug delivers higher 
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F I G U R E  2  Net health effects accruing to different parties over time for (a) 15,000/quality-adjusted life year (QALY) approval norm, 
and (b) 30,000/QALY approval norm for numeric example
(a)
(b)
health gains which are partially offset by additional production or NHS costs. The second drug delivers lower health gains 
but these are complemented by cost savings which produce health gains elsewhere in the health system. Despite both 
drugs delivering the same total potential net health gains, the realized population net health gains are lower for the first 
drug (3982 QALYs, 28% of the total) than the second (7426 QALYs, 52% of the total). When the approval norm exceeds 
the measure of health opportunity cost, health gains generated directly by the new product are valued more highly than 
health gains generated via cost savings by a factor of  / k.
The shares of value are not sensitive to the number of recipient patients or the magnitude of QALY gain4 as these 
rescale the value accruing to the health system and manufacturer proportionately.
Readers can explore the sensitivity of the numeric example to different scenarios and parameter inputs using the 
Microsoft Excel model provided in the supplementary material.
We now consider how estimates of value and value shares can be produced using data available for the UK setting.
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Metric Patent period Post-patent Total
Per patient values
 Total potential net health effects 0.50 0.50
 Realized population net health effects −0.50 0.50
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer 1.00 0.00
Total values accrued over time (undiscounted)
 Total potential net health effects 5000 45,000 50,000
 Realized population net health effects −5000 45,000 40,000
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer 10,000 0 10,000
Total values accrued over time (discounted)
 Total potential net health effects 4304 10,008 14,312
 Realized population net health effects −4304 10,008 5704
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer 8608 0 8608
Note: All values are net health effects in QALYs.
Abbreviations: k, measure of health opportunity cost; λ, approval norm; QALY, quality-adjusted life year.
T A B L E  3  Results of numeric example with approval norm set higher than measure of health opportunity cost (λ = 30,000/QALY, 
k = £15,000/QALY)
F I G U R E  3  Share of value accruing as population health gains at a range of approval norms relevant to National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) decision-making. Results reflect numeric example in Tables 1–3. QALY, quality-adjusted life year
3 | EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF VALUE
The framework outlined above indicates that, in addition to information relating to standard determinants of a product's 
cost-effectiveness and a measure of health opportunity cost, assessing the total value of a product, and how this is shared, 
requires information relating to the timing of availability of generic and biosimilar products, their uptake and pricing. 
The evidence available to inform these assessments for a series of case study products approved by NICE is described in 
the following sections.
3.1 | Evidence for the UK context
3.1.1 | Data from NICE appraisals
We apply the framework to 12 NICE technology appraisals. These appraisals were identified from recent work by the 
NICE Decision Support Unit (DSU) assessing the impact of the EQ-5D-5L on cost-effectiveness estimates (Pennington 
et al., 2018, 2019). We used case studies from this study as it provided estimates of the ICERs and incremental QALYs 
corresponding to the final committee decision, and used examples considered broadly representative of the NICE Tech-
nology Appraisal program. Importantly, the provision of ICERs and incremental QALYs corresponding to the final com-
mittee decision allowed our analysis to fully reflect any confidential discounts that had been agreed as part of the NICE 
commercial patient access schemes (PAS). The appraisals reflect a wide range of disease areas, biologic and small-mole-
cule drugs, drugs with and without PAS agreements, approved with and without EoL criteria applying, and represent a 
mixture of primary and secondary NICE-approved indications. The estimates are specific to the use of each drug in the 
indication under appraisal, and the overall value of the drug aggregated across indications will differ. Data required for 
the analysis were extracted as documented in Appendix B and are shown in Table 5.
3.1.2 | Measure of opportunity cost
We use £15,000/QALY as our measure of the opportunity cost of NHS health care funds. This reflects the most recent 
empirical evidence on the marginal productivity of the English NHS (Lomas et al., 2019). £15,000/QALY is also routinely 
used as the measure of health opportunity cost in the Department of Health and Social Care's impact assessments (De-
partment of Health, 2017; Department of Health and Social Care, 2018a, 2018b).
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Metric Additional costs scenario Cost savings scenario
Effects of treatment per patient
 Health gains, QALYs 0.70 0.30
 Production or health system costs, £ 3000 −3000
 Health implications of production/health system costs or savings, QALYs −0.20 0.20
Net health effects per treated patient, patent period
 Total potential net health effects, QALYs 0.50 0.50
 Realized population net health effects, QALYs −0.70 −0.30
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer, QALYs 1.20 0.80
Net health effects per treated patient, post-patent period
 Total potential net health effects, QALYs 0.50 0.50
 Realized population net health effects, QALYs 0.50 0.50
 Health foregone due to payments to manufacturer, QALYs 0.00 0.00
Note: Results for numeric example (λ = 30,000/QALY, k = £15,000/QALY).
Abbreviations: k, measure of health opportunity cost; λ, approval norm; QALY, quality-adjusted life year.















Disease (location of prescribing, 
whether drug is addition or 


































Alcohol dependence (SC/PC, 
addition)
No No No No £1110 11 £76 0.068 −£546 10.0 23,537 35,306
367 Vortioxetine 
(2015)
Major depressive episodes (SC/PC, 
substitute)
No No No No £2970 11 £49 0.017 £0 4.3 50,655 85,961
335 Rivaroxaban 
(2015)
Acute coronary syndrome (SC/PC, 
addition)
No No No 5th of 5 £5622 7 £675 0.120 £6 12.0 9642 11,505
228c Thalidomide 
(2010)
Multiple myeloma (SC, addition) No No No No £9174 8 £11,192 1.220 £0 11.0 1885 2030
392 Adalimumab 
(2016)
Hidradenitis suppurativa (SC, 
addition)
Yes Yes No 9th of 11 £19,328 3 £18,168 0.940 −£16,414 23.9 287 0
352 Vedolizumab 
(2015)
Crohn's disease (SC, addition) Yes Yes No 2nd of 2 £21,620 12 £3892 0.180 −£855 7.4 1175 317
377 Enzalutamide 
(2015)
Prostate cancer (pre-chemotherapy) 
(SC, addition)
No Yes No 2nd of 2 £32,985 12 £16,493 0.500 −£11,628 17.7 4195 4724
428 Pembrolizumab 
(2016)
Non-small cell lung cancer (SC, 
substitute)
Yes Yes Yes 3rd of 3 £44,490 12 £26,961 0.606 £2568 7.8 1540 1800
391d Cabazitaxel 
(2016)
Prostate cancer (SC, substitute) No Yes Yes No £45,159 11 £10,703 0.237 £0 4.2 370 370
316e Enzalutamide 
(2014)
Prostate cancer (post-chemotherapy) 
(SC, addition)
No Yes Yes 1st of 2 £45,626 13 £11,863 0.260 £586 8.5 335 226
357 Pembrolizumab 
(2015)
Melanoma (SC, addition) Yes Yes Yes 1st of 3 £46,662 13 £41,529 0.890 £1576 9.1 202 226
381 Olaparib (2015) Ovarian, fallopian tube and 
peritoneal cancer (SC, addition)
No Yes Yes No £46,973 12 £37,578 0.800 £2077 20.6 204 251
Note: EoL, end of life; FAD, final appraisal determination; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; PAS, patient access scheme; PC, primary care; QALYs, 
quality-adjusted life years; SC, secondary care; TA #, technology appraisal number.
aVariable shows whether new treatment is used in addition to standard of care or is used to substitute for an existing drug. 
bAverage over years 1–5 presented for brevity, actual annual year 1–5 data used in model. 
cThis appraisal also recommended bortezomib in patients considered unsuitable for thalidomide. This subgroup is not included here due to a lack of suitable data (see Appendix B). 
dWe focus on the subgroup of patients who are not eligible for treatment with abiraterone or enzalutamide. Cabazitaxel was also recommended within this appraisal for patients who could receive abiraterone or 
enzalutamide; however, there was insufficient data to analyze this subgroup (see Appendix B). 
eThis case study focuses on the subgroup of patients who had received two prior cytotoxic regimens. Enzalutamide was also recommended within this appraisal for patients who had received 1 prior cytotoxic regimen, 
however there was insufficient data to analyze this subgroup (see Appendix B).
T A B L E  5  Characteristics of included NICE appraisal case studies (ordered by ICER)
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Parameter Data sought Data available
Patent duration Duration of patent protection from 
marketing authorization for each 
appraised drug
Average time from marketing authorization to loss of 
the last type of patent protectiona across Europe for 
558 biologic and small-molecule products with a 
marketing authorization in the period 1996–2016 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2018). Estimated average 
duration of protection of 13 years.
Delays to market access Time from market authorization to NHS 
access for each appraised drug
Time from market authorization to NICE 
recommendation, or approval via the CDF if earlier, 
obtained from NICE appraisal documentation and 
CDF records (NHS, 2020). See Appendix B for data 
for each appraisal.
Time from loss of exclusivity to 
entry of generic/biosimilar 
products
Time to event analysis for different types of 
products
Time from loss of exclusivityb to first generic 
medicine being available for 128 top-selling small 
molecule drugs prescribed in the community 
that lost exclusivity in 2000–2007 (European 
Commission, 2009). Assumed to apply to small-
molecule drugs prescribed in hospitals. See 
Appendix C for time-to-event analysis.
De novo analysis of dates of biologic patent expiry and 
biosimilar availability using prescribing outlook 
data (UK Medicines Information, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016) for 34 biologic drugs. See Appendix C for 
further detail and for time-to-event analysis.
Uptake of generic/biosimilar 
products once available
Market share of branded versus generic/
biosimilar products following availability 
of generic/biosimilar for different types 
of products
No data available for small-molecule drugs used in 
hospitals. Assumed 100% uptake given tendering 
processes in place and centralized dispensing.
Biologic/biosimilar tendering process (NHS, 2017) 
assumed to result in similar prices for originator and 
biosimilar, which is equivalent to assuming 100% 
uptake for biosimilar.
Pricing of generic/biosimilar 
products
Price of different types of generic/biosimilar 
products according to relevant product 
characteristics
No data available for small-molecule products used in 
hospitals. De novo analysis of the current generic 
prices of 16 products appraised by NICE in the 
period 2000–2004. Monthly costs estimated using 
regimen data from the appraisals and generic 
product costs from eMIT (Department of Health and 
Social Care, 2017) for 2017–2018. Mean monthly cost 
estimated as £63 (£118 for vials; £30 for tablets). See 
Appendix D for further details.
Biologic/biosimilar cost £329 per month based on 
publicly available tendering documents (National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2008, 
2010a, 2010b, 2016a, 2016b; NHS, 2019b). See 
Appendix D for further details.
Monthly costs are multiplied by the duration of 
treatment (see Table 5)c.
Abbreviations: CDF, cancer drugs fund; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.
aThis includes the original patent and secondary patents, supplementary protection certificate (SPC), data protection and market protection (including 
extensions for new therapeutic indications), and further protections for orphan product designations and pediatric investigation plans. bThis includes 
protection through patents including extensions via an SPC and data exclusivity. cWhere a small-molecule drug was replacing an existing small molecule 
drug, the incremental cost of production was assumed to be zero. Where a biologic replaces a small molecule drug, the incremental marginal cost is calculated 
as the difference between the small molecule and biologic cost. This ignores potential differences in duration of treatment between the existing therapy and 
comparator but should provide a reasonable approximation.
T A B L E  6  Data describing generics and biosimilar availability, usage and acquisition costs in the UK NHS
3.1.3 | Data relating to the generics and biosimilars market in the UK
Data were also sought on the period of patent protection for each product, and the availability, use and pricing of generic 
and biosimilar products in the UK. These data are summarized in Table 6. As noted by previous authors, there is an ab-
sence of publicly available data on a number of these quantities (Copenhagen Economics, 2018; Ferraro et al., 2018; GaBI 
Online, 2011). In particular, expected dates for loss of patent protection are not publicly reported for individual drugs. 
There were also limited relevant data on uptake of generic/biosimilar products and their pricing, so these quantities 
had to be estimated using additional sub-analyses and, in some instances, assumptions informed by discussions with 
individuals with experience of the UK medicines market. Prices for biosimilars reflect publicly available tender prices for 
adalimumab and infliximab. These tenders achieved significant discounts compared to the corresponding biologic prices 
and previous prices for biosimilars. Nonetheless, the monthly cost of biosimilars is estimated to exceed the monthly cost 
of small-molecule generics by approximately 500%.
We assume that generic (and biosimilar) prices reflect underlying marginal costs of production and that, by implica-
tion, policy makers and competition authorities have provided an appropriate environment for generic competition. We 
return to this assumption in the discussion.
The spreadsheet populated with these data is available as a Microsoft Excel model in the supplementary material. 
This allows users to generate estimates of value and value shares for other products.
4 | ESTIMATES OF TOTAL NET HEALTH GAINS AND HOW THESE ARE SHARED 
FOR NICE-APPROVED PRODUCTS
Estimates of the total potential net health gains for each appraisal, and how these are shared are shown in Table 7. For the 
four appraisals where the final appraisal determination (FAD) ICER was substantively lower than the measure of oppor-
tunity cost (nalmefene, vortioxetine, rivaroxaban and thalidomide), realized population net health effects are 81%–94% 
of the total potential net health effects. Adalimumab, vedolizumab and enzalutamide initiated in patients who had not 
received prior chemotherapy had FAD ICERs close to the stated NICE approval norm range of £20,000–30,000/QALY. For 
enzalutamide initiated in patients who had not received prior chemotherapy, realized population net health gains rep-
resent 21% of the total potential net health benefits. For adalimumab and vedolizumab the manufacturer accrues more 
than 100% of the total potential net health gains and population health is reduced by these approvals. This reflects the 
approval norm used, the slow emergence of biosimilar drugs and their relatively high cost, and the expected prescribing 
pattern of these drugs in the appraised indications. Hidradenitis Suppurativa and Crohn's disease are both chronic dis-
eases and use of the drugs is expected to be relatively high in the short term due to the large pool of prevalent cases. The 
remaining five drugs were considered to meet the EoL criteria by NICE committees and were approved at FAD ICERs 
of £44,000–47,000/QALY. For all of these appraisals the manufacturer accrues more than 100% of the total potential net 
health gains. Losses in population health in these appraisals ranged from 18% to 160% of total potential net health gains, 
and depended on features of the appraisals including whether the drug was a small molecule or biologic product. Across 
the products considered, the health system accrues 51% of the total potential net health gains.
Three of the products (nalmefene, vortioxetine, and rivaroxaban) may be prescribed in primary care. Results for an 
analysis assuming primary care prescribing were similar to that shown in Table 7 and are shown in Appendix E.
We examined how shares of value change if the approval norm is changed, for the small-molecule and biologic case 
study appraisals (Figure 4). At any chosen approval norm, there is wide variation in the share of total potential net health 
effects that accrue as population health effects. If a policy maker intended to achieve a specific share of value, they would 
need to use different approval norms across products. For example, to achieve a share of 50% would imply an approv-
al norm of £12,000–24,000/QALY for the small-molecule products examined, and £4000–14,000/QALY for the biologic 
products examined. Of course, these drugs represent only a sample of those appraised by NICE within each category and 
the true ranges across all products will be wider.
Decision makers may have other policy tools at their disposal which could improve the share of value accruing to the 
populations they serve. For example, they may be able to improve access to, and use of, generic and biosimilar products, 
as well as the price paid for these products. There is some sign that this is already happening for biologics as tendering 
processes (NHS, 2017) and increased competition improve prices, and policy initiatives and greater acceptance of bio-
similar medicines by clinicians improve uptake (NHS Business Services Authority, 2019). We examined the impact of en-
suring immediate availability and full uptake of generic/biosimilar products at patent expiry alongside a price reduction 
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of 25% from current levels. Full results of this analysis are shown in Appendix F. These changes result in vedolizumab 
and adalimumab delivering positive value to the NHS. With these changes, the same shares of value could be achieved at 
higher approval norms. For example, to achieve a share of 50% would imply an approval norm of £18,000–34,000/QALY 
for the small-molecule products and £8000-20,000/QALY for the biologic products examined.
5 | DISCUSSION
This work provides a framework for assessing the total potential net health effects of new branded medicines and how 
these are shared between manufacturers and patients served by health systems. By providing this general framework and 
accompanying Excel spreadsheets, this framework can be applied to assess value shares internationally.
Our analysis of UK NICE approvals indicates that the share of value accruing to manufacturers is much high-
er, and the share accruing to patients served by health systems, much lower, than previously estimated (Camejo 
et al., 2014; Grabner et al., 2011; Jena & Philipson, 2008; Lindgren & Jonsson, 2012; Moreno & Ray, 2016). This work 
differs from previous studies in that it recognizes that approval norms used as the basis for pricing and reimburse-
ment decisions differ from measures of opportunity cost, and that value continues to accrue even when a product is 
obsolete as new products build on health gains from existing technologies. For many approvals (seven of the 12 case 
studies considered here), we found that the manufacturer accrues more than 100% of the total potential net health 
gains generated by the drug. These approvals therefore lead to reductions in overall population health even in the 
long run.
A range of factors above and beyond health effects may be considered important when assessing the value of a new 
medicine. For example, NICE gives extra weight to QALYs generated at the EoL, and the Institute's current methods 
consultation is considering a range of potential “modifiers” which may influence approval decisions. A number of com-
mentators have emphasized that if these additional factors are used to re-weight benefits in patients who receive the new 
drug, then logically the health losses associated with devoting resources to new medicines should be re-weighted in the 
same way (Paulden & McCabe, 2021; Sculpher et al., 2017). Incorporation of additional “benefits” can therefore result in 
medicines appearing both more or less valuable than an analysis focused solely on health effects (Love-Koh et al., 2019). 
There is a lack of clarity about whether such additional considerations would be viewed by society as outweighing the 
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Nalmefene 1110 80,460 73,188 7271 91 9
Vortioxetine 2970 37,758 35,165 2593 93 7
Rivaroxaban 5622 30,605 28,774 1831 94 6
Thalidomide 9174 68,772 55,693 13,079 81 19
Adalimumab 19,328 2038 −292 2330 −14 114
Vedolizumab 21,620 991 −432 1423 −44 144
Enzalutamide (pre-chemotherapy) 32,985 124,410 26,176 98,234 21 79
Pembrolizumab (NSCLC) 44,490 16,360 −26,126 42,486 −160 260
Cabazitaxel 45,159 2510 −456 2966 −18 118
Enzalutamide (post-chemotherapy) 45,626 1521 −1036 2557 −68 168
Pembrolizumab (melanoma) 46,662 3717 −5312 9029 −143 243
Olaparib 46,973 4317 −2078 6394 −48 148
Total - 373,458 183,265 190,193 49 51
Note: FAD, final appraisal determination; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; NSCLC, non-
small-cell lung cancer; QALY, quality-adjusted life year.
T A B L E  7  Value and value share estimates for NICE approved products
Our empirical estimates relate to the UK context; however, there is growing evidence across countries that approval 
norms used to inform drug reimbursement decisions exceed measures of the opportunity costs of health care expenditure 
(Claxton et al., 2015; Lomas et al., 2019; Ochalek et al., 2018). It may, therefore, be reasonable to expect similar patterns 
of value sharing in other countries.
Consistent with how economic analysis has tended to inform health-care decision making, we focus on improve-
ments in population health as the primary objective of health systems (Drummond et al., 2015). Some previous studies 
have aggregated the benefits of new pharmaceuticals across health system and manufacturers, to assess overall welfare 
implications (Jena & Philipson, 2008). This is challenging as payments to manufacturers do not equate to producer sur-
plus (due to substantial product development costs) and decision-making bodies have been unwilling to identify a social 
welfare function specifying how we might appropriately trade-off producer surplus with population health.
Notwithstanding these considerations, it is possible to consider the total potential net health effects, and realized 
population net health effects in terms of consumption value or individuals' willingness to pay (v), and to compare these 
to payments to manufacturers. As total potential net health effects and realized population net health effects are revalued 
in the same way, this does not change the share of value accruing as population health gains, and therefore our primary 
conclusions. Importantly, negative net health effects will remain negative regardless of how they are valued. The share 
of value accruing to manufacturers is reduced to 3%–130% if the consumption value of health is £30,000/QALY and to 
1%–65% if it is £60,000/QALY (see Appendix G). This reflects that payments to manufacturers could have generated con-
sumption value at a higher rate (by a factor of v/k) if retained in the health system and used to generate health.
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F I G U R E  4  Range of shares of value across (a) small molecule and (b) biologic drugs for different approval norms. The shaded area 
shows the range of shares of value across the 12 products at different approval norms. The dashed lines indicate the range of approval norms 
required to deliver a 50% share of value for drugs within each category
(a)
(b)
5.1 | Additional considerations
The estimates presented are predicated on generic/biosimilar prices eventually being realized. This may happen 
directly as patients use the generic/biosimilar product, or indirectly, by future products pricing relative to the ge-
neric/biosimilar product. This work emphasizes that if a generic/biosimilar version of a comparator is available, 
we should always price relative to the generic/biosimilar. For some appraisals, comparators remain within patent. 
In this context it is appropriate to price relative to the branded comparator and then adjust pricing once generic/
biosimilar versions of the comparator become available. As long as this re-pricing occurs, the net health gains as-
sociated with the branded comparator will materialize even if it is replaced in clinical practice by the new drug. If 
re-pricing does not occur this transfers cost savings that should have accrued to the NHS to the manufacturer of 
the new product, and reduces population health. This re-pricing is not, to our knowledge, standard practice in the 
UK. When appraising medicines with branded comparators, NICE and other reimbursement bodies could usefully 
pre-specify the price adjustment required when the generic/biosimilar version of the comparator becomes availa-
ble. Compared to the status quo, this would be expected to disincentivize R&D efforts in clinical indications where 
existing branded therapies are being used, and increase incentives to invest in areas where older generic/biosimilar 
products are being used.
We assumed that prices of generics/biosimilars are reflective of marginal costs of production. If prices exceed margin-
al costs, this won't modify realized population net health effects which are influenced by prices paid rather than underly-
ing costs. In this scenario total value will be higher than estimated here with additional value accruing to the originator 
manufacturer and generic/biosimilar supply chain.
Many pharmaceutical products are used and appraised for multiple indications. This raises the question of 
whether losses in population health in one indication could be justified by gains in another. Under indication-based 
pricing, a separate pricing decision is made for each indication, and it is unclear what considerations would support 
pricing that results in a loss in population health in any individual indication. Where a single price applies across in-
dications we might expect net health gains in secondary indications if the price set for the first indication represents 
a “ceiling”. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the case if secondary indications offer lower value and/
or approval norms exceed measures of opportunity cost. Of the five secondary indications within our case studies, 
four of the approvals were expected to result in population health losses. There may also be health gains if price 
discounts in secondary indications apply to earlier indications as observed in two of the case studies considered. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be no clear rational for setting prices at a level that reduces population health in early 
indications on the basis that this could be offset by gains from later indications. The secondary indications and price 
reductions may never materialize, and high prices for early indications may disincentive launches in secondary 
indications.
In the UK there are Voluntary and Statutory Schemes through which branded medicine manufacturers pay a share 
of their sales back to the NHS to help control growth in NHS branded medicine spends. The amount paid back varies by 
year (depending on forecast and actual growth in sales and exemptions) but it is typically 5%–10% of sales (Department of 
Health & Social Care, 2019; Ferraro et al., 2018). Inclusion of this magnitude of repayments does not modify value shares 
markedly or alter our conclusions.
5.2 | Implications for pricing of pharmaceuticals
An important consideration is whether current payment levels can be justified on the basis that they spur innovation, 
delivering more products and health gains in the future. Long-term net health effects driven by these dynamic effects are 
as legitimate as those driven by static considerations (i.e., net health gains from existing drugs). However, pricing that 
results in losses to population health cannot be dynamically efficient. This level of pricing incentivizes the development 
of future innovations at prices which will also reduce overall health. It would be better for population health if products 
that can only be incentivized by this level of pricing were not brought to market.
Conversely, a policy that allocates minimal value to manufacturers would stall product development. To deter-
mine the appropriate pricing level between allocating 0% and 100% of value to manufacturers, it is necessary to 
account for both the net health implications for products that are approved, as quantified here, and how pricing 
contributes to the development of new products (Palnoch,  2019; Pandey et  al.,  2018). Further work should aim 
to incorporate these dynamic effects. In this work we have focused on individual appraisals, and a single country 
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setting. The dynamic implications of different pricing policies will be determined by the collective implications of 
international pricing.
When considering the implications of this work for pricing policy, it is also necessary to consider the uncertainty 
surrounding the realized population net health effects and payments to manufacturers. From the health systems' per-
spective, higher uncertainty may necessitate lower prices for unconditional approval to be granted, or the use of condi-
tional reimbursement arrangements (Claxton et al, 2012). However, conditional reimbursement increases uncertainty in 
payments for the manufacturer, and the dynamic implications of this should also be accounted for.
Finally, our work highlights that current pricing and reimbursement policies will share total value differently depend-
ing on product characteristics. For example, biologic products for which generic versions are slower to market and more 
expensive result in less favorable shares for population health, and more favorable shares for manufacturers. Similarly, 
products targeting indications with large numbers of prevalent cases, with short treatment durations, or additional costs 
result in less favorable shares for population health and more favorable shares for manufacturers. This suggests that cur-
rent value-based pricing is not directly aligned with total lifetime value and that differential approval norms or payments 
based on shares of total value may provide a clearer signal of value.
5.3 | Limitations
Aspects of our model were challenging to parameterize due to a lack of publicly available data relating to patent pro-
tection, and availability, pricing and market shares for generic/biosimilar products. Given the importance of this infor-
mation in assessing the value delivered by pharmaceuticals, and the performance of the UK generics and biosimilars 
markets, a more concerted effort to make these data publicly available is warranted.
The conclusions presented here rest on an assessment that the approval norms used in reimbursement processes ex-
ceed measures of opportunity cost. There is a growing body of evidence that supports this conclusion (Claxton et al., 2015; 
Lomas et al., 2019; Ochalek et al., 2018) though the exact value for both approval norms and estimates of opportunity cost 
are subject to ongoing research and vary internationally.
We assumed for simplicity that the measure of opportunity cost would remain constant over time. Data for the period 
2003-2012 suggest that the measure of opportunity cost has been increasing in real terms (Lomas et al., 2019). However, 
forecasting the measure of opportunity cost over time requires an understanding of real growth in health expenditure, 
health needs and productivity which is beyond the scope of this study, and particularly challenging in a post-Covid 
context.5
6 | CONCLUSIONS
In this study we show how to estimate the total potential long-term value of new branded pharmaceuticals and how this 
is shared between patients served by health systems and manufacturers. We show that in the UK the use of approval 
norms that exceed measures of opportunity cost means that many NICE approvals are expected to reduce overall popu-
lation health even in the long-run. Further work is required to consider how these findings should be reflected in reim-
bursement policies.
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ENDNOTES
 1 The Department of Health and Social Care has adopted £15,000/quality-adjusted life year (QALY) as the estimate of health opportunity cost 
in their impact assessments (Department of Health, 2017; Department of Health and Social Care, 2018a, 2018b) based on empirical estimates 
of the marginal productivity of NHS expenditure; for the latest estimates see Lomas et al. (2019).
 2 This may be due to increased uptake in existing clinical indications, or expansion to additional clinical indications. If this results in expan-
sion to indications that are less valuable, this could reduce the share of value accruing as population health gains.
 3 The magnitude of these effects will depend on long-term rates of discontinuation from treatment.
 4 The QALY gain can modify the share of value when the approval norm differs from the measure of opportunity cost and there are non-prod-
uct costs or savings. When the approval norm exceeds the measure of opportunity cost and there are non-product costs (savings), larger 
QALY gains increase (reduce) the share of value accruing as population health gains.
 5 In a post-Covid context it is less clear that the measure of opportunity cost will continue to rise, as growth in expenditure may not continue 
to outstrip growth in needs and productivity.
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